The theory of substance and the characterisation of the aristotelian soul

Authors

Abstract

When Aristotle defines the soul as οὐσία in De Anima, he clearly states that the sense he takes into account is that of form. However, his treatments of οὐσία seem not to utterly coincide with this one because they mainly points to the sense of the matter-form compound. Is there a sense that fits the soul? Metaphysics Z, 17 could provide an answer.

Keywords:

Aristotle, Soul, οὐσία, Form

Author Biography

Eva Monardes-Pereira, Universidad de Chile

Correspondencia: Eva Monardes Pereira
Email: emonardes@ug.uchile.cl
Magíster en Filosofía, Universidad de Chile.
ORCID ID: 0000-0001-9020-0898.